Consuming Trauma; or, The Pleasures of Merely Circulating by Yaeger, Patricia
Journal X 
Volume 1 
Number 2 Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring 1997) Article 6 
Consuming Trauma; or, The Pleasures of Merely Circulating 
Patricia Yaeger 
University of Michigan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx 
 Part of the Comparative Literature Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Yaeger, Patricia () "Consuming Trauma; or, The Pleasures of Merely Circulating," Journal X: Vol. 1 : No. 2 , 
Article 6. 
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol1/iss2/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the English at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Journal X by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu. 
Consuming Trauma; or,
 




at the University of
 Michigan. She is the
 editor of The Geog
­raphy of Identity (U
 of
 











 UP, 1988). Her next
 book is “Dirt and
 Desire: the Grotesque
 in Southern Womens
 Fiction. "
Wallace Stevens begins his poem, “The Pleasures of
 
Merely Circulating,” with delicious nonsense: “The
 garden flew round with the angel, / The angel flew
 round with the clouds, / And the clouds flew round
 and the clouds flew round / And the clouds flew
 round with the clouds.” But I want to 
exit 
from these  
giddy circles and come down to earth, asking the
 reader to join me on a journey less certain of its plea
­sures. Come down, then; let
 
us run the length of this  
field, sallying back and forth between two ill-
matched citations: the first an inviting statement of
purpose from a new academic journal, the second an
oddly moving, oddly spectral statement from Derri-
da:
Journal x is not committed to any particular set of
 
answers or even approaches to the question of
 pleasure, only to the question itself. . . . Our
 immediate editorial goal is a good deal more
 modest, indirect, and open-ended: to serve as a
 sort of ongoing research archive into what Žižek
 might call “enjoyment as an intellectual
 
factor” by  
publishing scholarly and personal essays that
 themselves give pleasure. (Kamps and Watson 2)
First of all, mourning. We will be speaking of
 
nothing else. It consists always in attempting to
 ontologize remains, to make them present, in the
 first place by identifying the bodily remains and
 by localizing the dead (all ontologization, all
 semanticization . . . finds itself caught up in this
 work of mourning but, as such, it does not yet
1





 we are posing here the  
(Derrida 9)
question of the specter, to the specter).
L'Allegro, Il
 
Penseroso; gang of pleasure, gang of pain; Team Jouissance, Team  
Specter. Running over and through this field, I really want to run around it: to
 run, if nowhere else, amok. But for me there is no other way. If I am to write
 this essay, I have to navigate the work of mourning in order to arrive at plea
­sure's archive, sliding between opposing manifestos, hoping to create a small
 universe in which I can suture two inverse inclinations — namely, our irre
­pressible longing for pleasure and our traffic in specters: our omnivorous con
­versations with the implacable dead.
As I start to write this an announcement comes in from Pretoria. Five of
 
the murderers of Steven Biko have confessed under the auspices of a general
 amnesty. A few days later, The New York Times article on Biko’s death features
 a strange double picture from a museum exhibit in Pretoria. At its outer reach
­es the camera has recorded a grand, upflung portrait of Biko
'
s head — suggest ­
ing a persona already classicized, at a distance, monumental, heroic. A didactic
 body, yes, but also, in its way, a body 
for
 pleasure, evoking identification with  
the spirit of a deeply ethical man. Beneath this picture the 
museum
 has flung  
another replica of Biko’s person (this ti e solid, tactile, plastic, inert) depicting
 a body facedown, on the floor, bound, contorted, bleeding, opened: a terrifying
 representation of a person battered and left to die on the floor of a South
 African jail (Burns 4).
Between the heroic picture and its obscene plastic double, this exhibit
 
attempts to instantiate two different versions of mourning. First, it offers a
 body that is easy
 
to introject, to sublimate into a system of great, representative  
men. But beneath this 
sublime
 portraiture we meet something more tenuous  
and closer to home: a body that seems harder to swallow. Instead of
 
Biko’s  
greatness we are reminded of the power of his political adversaries and his own
 loss of agency: of flesh that is open to brutality,
 
inertia, decay; of a world unap ­
proachable through grief but openly melancholy over the body’s vulnerability
 and its unfinished projects — a space with too much ancestry. In presenting a
 butchered body that refuses to be consumed (tipping the viewer
 
back and forth  
between anger and melancholy, between heroism 
and
 the desuetude  — the dis ­
quiet — of unusable grief), this double picture attempts,, as Derrida says, to
 “ontologize remains,” to give them density, spatiality, to identify bodily
 
remains  
“by localizing the dead.”
How
 
do  we speak to the dead? Or speak  about  them? What weight  should  
they have in our texts? Last week I waved the picture of Biko’s bodies at 
my students, trying to drive home the contrast between the semiotics of the
 upflung body and the relentless grotesque, trying to say, “Look, body politics is
 not just a topic in this course but a set of tropes we constantly deploy.” And yet
 my voice
 
breaks when I talk  about the body that inhabits the  bottom half of the  
frame, and I think, I don’t like my dead to 
be
 this local. It upsets the balance,  
calls out too many ghosts. But every
 
time I get rid of one ghost, another takes 
its place. This time I am shopping. I see a placard in the back window of a
 
large
 van. “My son was killed by a drunk driver. I am MADD.” Once again  
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the unexpected ontologizing of remains, the making present, the relentless
 
localizing. I want to walk away, 
and
 yet my own flesh surprises me with its  
vehemence, an anger directed not at the drunk driver, but at the narrator, the
 
driver
 of this car. I think, "Why is she saying this to me?” before I construct  
the proper empathic response. Of course this woman has as much right to hurl
 invectives, to call out the ghost, as anyone.
What do we owe to the dead? 
For
 IRA nationalists (those who became  
political prisoners during the 1970s and supported 
Bobby
 Sands throughout  
the Hunger Strike of 1981),
 
the dying demanded a special brand of silence;  they  
aroused  a painful new consciousness about the irrelevance of everyday speech.
When a guy was on hunger strike in the wing, the noise level went down.
 
Everybody was conscious all the time that there was someone next to you
 dying. When the food came around you had to be conscious about not
 shouting, "What do you think of the meat today?” Your complaints were
 relegated to something meaningless. You couldn’t go to the door and shout,
 "There’s something with this grub.” (Feldman 248)
It seems all too clear what 
one
 owes to the dying, but with the dead, the case  
seems utterly different and perhaps more diffuse:
The night
 
Bobby Sands died was just... you never  heard a sound  for  hours.  
Nobody spoke and nobody would go near the door. The way
 
we knew he 
was dead, a screw 
came
 down and there was a grill at the end of the wing,  
and with his baton he started banging the grill slowly, Dong! — dong! —
 dong! — like a church bell. It was just a hollow 
sound.
 From that point on 
whenever someone died the screws would ring the grill and another one
 would
 
walk up the wing slowly  pulling a trolley behind him, saying, "Bring  
out your dead. How many dead do youse have 
for
 us today?”: It was like  
the plague. (249)
Once we enter this hollow space and try to imagine Sands’s slow and deliber
­
ate death, the thematizing question —
 
what do we owe to the dead? — seems  
both impertinent and much too obtuse. And yet deferring this question seems
 equally counterproductive. We need to take note of the ease with which Bobby
 Sands’s heartbeat, his voice, can be displaced by a screw, a prison guard, bang
­ing the grill slowly. As the guard cries out in his mocking voice, the empty
 space left by a man’s death becomes frighteningly co-optable, available to oth
­ers; it demands renewed efforts at counter-speech. Yet how do we narrate or
 speak for the dead? What allows this speech to grant them proper weight, sub
­stance, dignity? If this weight is too heavy, can we go 
on
 writing? Do  we  want  
to? If the weight
 
is too light, can we do justice to the injustices endured by  the  
specter?
In interviews with members of the IRA prison collective recorded in Allen
 
Feldman’s Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror
 in Northern Ireland, we learn that for those who bore witness to Sands’s death,
 "a new sense of urgency ... set in all around. It meant that you were scrubbing
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[writing] all day. . . . [I]t gave everybody a sense of doing something” (247). It
 
is the question of writing, of finding proper tropes, that obsesses Sands’s fellow
 prisoners:
The Hunger Strike completed the textualization of the prisoner’s body. As
 
Bobby Sands and subsequent
 
hunger strikers lay dying, the rest  of the Blan ­
ketmen engaged in the intensified production of political texts that were
 smuggled out of the prison. These texts constituted a literature of conver
­sion, letters to international organizations, political groups, unions, govern
­ments, and prominent individuals which publicized the Hunger Strike and
 asked support 
for
 the protest. Certain prisoners writing with pen refills on  
cigarette papers were able to produce 200 letters a day. It was a remarkable
 literary production which seemed to flow directly from the dying body of
 the hunger 
strike.
 (250)
The ventriloquism we lend to the dead, the tropes we clothe them in, can have
 
the power to re-dress their 
bodies,
 to speak  volumes.
Differently positioned (not only not incarcerated, but at relative leisure to
 pursue polymorphous political passions), liberal academics also reproduce for
 themselves and their students stories of trauma, structural violence, systematic
 injustice, slaughter, inequality. These painful stories — about deterritorializa-
 tion, decolonization, people pushed past the margins, bodies brutalized, chil
­dren victimized, populations dying, in exile — suggest a world of subsemantic
 history that
 
demands the weight  of political speech. At the same time (or with ­
in the same heterodox space but under another name), we inhabit an academic  
world that is
 
busy consuming trauma — busy eating, swallowing,  perusing,  con ­
suming, exchanging, circulating, creating professional connections — through
 its stories about the dead. We are obsessed with stories that must be passed on,
 that must not be passed over. But aren’t we also drawn to these stories from
 within an elite culture driven by its own economies: by
 
the pains and pleasures  
of needing to publish, by salaries and promotions that are themselves driven by
 acts of publication, by, among other forces, the pleasures of merely circulating?
From within this complex matrix of pleasure and
 
pain, I want  to come  back  
to my earlier question. Given the danger
 
of commodification and the pleasures  
of academic melancholy — of those exquisite acts of mourning that create a
 conceptual profit — what are our responsibilities when we write about the
 dead? In describing the fate of 
Bobby
 Sands, or the bodies of "cunts” (desig ­
nated male victims of political violence) and "stiffs” (dead bodies that deliver a
 ""message” of feminization to the other side) that have transformed Belfast’s
 political geography, does Feldman meet these responsibilities, does he take the
 right tone? Do I? How are we allowed to taste the dead’s bodies, to put their
 lives in our mouths? How do we identify the proper tone, the proper images,
 for holding — for awakening — someone else’s bodily remains?
This question has been called forth unexpectedly, reluctantly, unpre
­
dictable by the last issue — also the first issue — of Journal
 
x. Turning its  
pages with a prospective happiness and dread (a bizarre, all-too-familiar hap
­
piness
 bred of proprietorship: there’s my name, I’m part of this editorial board;  
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there’s my space, I’ve been asked to write a review-essay 
on
 “Reading for Plea ­
sure”), I’m enjoying myself I 
like
 reading about late-night TV in the essay on  
Céline and “Lettermania”; I’m interested in Civil-War American freaks, and
 then I turn to the next to the last
 
essay, “Estranged Fruit: Making and Unmak ­
ing 
in
 Mississippi’s Jails” — thinking randomly, circumlocuitously (as I sit in  
the dusky half-light of a midwestern afternoon, awash in that meditative fren
­zy bred of reading too much southern literature) — I think — oh, here’s a
 
piece  
on the South, and I dive into the article, feet first, before my exuberance turns
 to 
dust. “Estranged Fruit: Making and Unmaking in Mississippi’s Jails” is an essay
 that begins with portraits of black men who have died 
in
 Mississippi’s jails.  
Andre Jones, the son of local NAACP activists, was brought to the Simpson
 County
 
Jail on August 22, 1992, on multiple charges that included carrying a  
concealed weapon and
 
possessing a stolen vehicle. He was 18. Less than twen ­
ty-four hours later
 
Jones was found hanging in his cell — dangling from the  
shoelace of his own Nike sneaker.
Reading this essay about Andre Jones and other people who have died in
 
Mississippi’s jails, I no longer feel able to write about my own acts of reading
 for pleasure. Instead, I want to take up the status of griefwork, of the work of
 mourning, in academic writing. What happens when we “textualize” bodies,
 when
 
we write about other people s deaths (or other people’s cultures) as some ­
thing 
one
 “reads”? The author of “Estranged Fruit,” Barry Gildea, argues that  
“jails are sites for complex and plural readings, especially where contested hang
­ings occur. The incidental death category marks the first opportunity to
 explore a more imaginative or creative interpretation of the jail hanging as a
 mythic and literary act of incidental annihilation through intentional civil dis
­obedience” (124). What does it mean to convert someone’s death while in cus
­tody into a
 
“literary act”? If this in fact, a suicide, how should  we respond  
to the suggestion that Jones’s failure to leave a suicide note must be “read” as an
 act of resistance? (That is, what constitutes proper evidence 
for
 drawing such  
a conclusion? Who is doing the “writing” here — and why?) Or how do we
 evaluate this conclusion: “By resisting the urge to determine and dictate the
 meaning of his death, Jones has insured that he will be 
heard.
 He imposes no  
meaning, but still ‘imprisons’ you
 
within a text, a world of his own (un)making,  
a world which soon becomes peopled with the texts of other hanging bodies”
 (116)? In what sense can a hanging body be “a text”? What happens when
 “imprisons”
 
becomes a floating signifier that slips away from its referent so eas ­
ily? No longer a description of the physical crisis experienced by a black man
 in custody, it becomes a loosely held metaphor describing
 
the  psychological  sta ­
tus of an elite group of readers.
This transferability suggests a too easy equivalence between epistemologi
­
cal prisons and actual
 
ones, between the dead and the  living. What are the dan ­
gers inherent 
in
 figuring  — or dis-figuring  — the specter? How far should we  
go in invoking the ghost, how far in consuming its traumas? If circulating the
 suffering of others has become the meat and potatoes of our profession, if this
 circulation evokes a lost history
 
but also runs the dangers of commodification,  
then how should we proceed? In producing figures that are either too vacuous
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or too lurid, too theatrical or too theoretical, can one reproduce trauma or loss
 
in the wrong way? To put this somewhat differently, how do we control our
 own acts of écriture, of seeming to 
read
 bodies, when we may really  be reading,  
then acting upon (interpreting and reinscribing) our own figurations?
To answer these questions, my argument needs to extend beyond
 
“Estranged Fruit’”s local strategies. To stay honest, I will have to turn back on
 my own mode of troping the death of Steven Biko, my own act of 
invoking
 the  
specter. (Is this a too opportunistic, too lurid way of inviting the audience into
 this essay? And who decides?) But I also want to focus on two urgent ques
­tions. First, what is the role of the critics own writing in producing someone
 else's death as a “text”? Second, what resources should 
elites
 bring to bear in  
ventriloquizing the world on behalf of non-elites — how conscious should we
 be about usurping others’ worlds with our words? These are questions with
 subtexts: in asking whether there are proper and improper styles for eliciting
 the stories of the dead, we need to reexamine the appropriations of anthropol
­ogy’s powerful methods within the burgeoning field of cultural studies. And in
 asking whether we can participate in critique without overriding the effects and
 affect of local mourning, we need
 
to reexamine the thematics of loss that  so pre ­
occupies a post-Marxist academy. For if the abiding question of this essay is
 what we owe to the dead, this question has to be nuanced once again. The
 question is not only what is our
 
stake in their narratives, but  what is their  stake  
in ours.
With these questions in mind, let us turn again to “Estranged Fruit: Mak
­
ing and Unmaking in Mississippi’s Jails,” for 
here
 is an essay that speaks about  
the recently dead, of a young black man, and then another black man, of white
 men and women, all found hanging. The deaths of these black men while in
 custody have been interpreted by their own African-American communities as
 lynchings but labeled officially as suicides. Gildea’s verdict, as well, is that these
 deaths are suicides, that they “indicate a strong commitment to live or die 
by
 a  
nomos other than that of the state of Mississippi: namely, the dignity, honesty,
 and sovereignty of a pure form of American individualism. Inmate suicide is a
 singular act of subversion, both a renunciation and an enunciation of violence”
 (139).
Before launching into my critique — set off, in part, by disbelief
 
in such  
purity — I should say that I’m convinced Gildea embarked on this essay with
 the best will in the world — that is, with every intention of making new space
 for the dead to speak. But 
for
 me the fine line between ventriloquism and  
depersonification (what I will later describe as the de-anthropomorphizing of
 the persons of black men who have died while in custody) gets breached 
here again and again, perhaps because Gildea is so eager to close the door on the
 possibility that these men were murdered; or perhaps because, in the specter’s
 presence, “appropriate” acts of personification are hard to control. In any event,
 Gildea argues that the quick availability of southern narratives of lynching for
 describing deaths while in custody may cause politically minded, left-leaning
 critics to 
overlook
 the despairing sense of agency that drives some men and  
women to kill themselves while in jail. That is, enthralled by victims’ stories,
 critics of state 
violence
 may fail to register an inmate’s desperate attempt at  
embodied protest.
6





But the desire to construct this alternative scene of instruction is complex
­
ly motivated. Gildea 
insists
 that the “theory” that Jones and his compatriots  
were lynched “has abstracted the villains, so that all of white Mississippi is
 implicated as a mob” (120). Indeed? What are the author
'
s own transference  
points, the nodes of racial crisis or white writing that motivate such 
observa­tions? What anxieties might the narrative of a black mans “heroic” suicide
 attempt to ward off? Later in this essay I want to generalize from the particu
­lars of this essay to explore the problems in transferential thinki
ng
 that can  
remain sublimated or subliminal within the current methodologies of cultural
 studies. But for now, let me 
suggest
 that Gildea’s argument about heroic sui ­
cides in custody suffers from numerous epistemological glitches, including its
 misapplication of a romantic 
version
 of unified selfhood (felt in the invocation  
of “a pure form of American individualism”), its description of the possibility of
 a purely instrumental response to prison trauma (in ecstatic tones reminiscent
 of Byrons “The Prisoner of Chillon”), and its ends-dominated interpretation of
 events (the notion that we’re allowed to write history backwards, from results
 we can see to intentions we can only intuit). But however strong my sense of
 epistemological recoil at the model of history that constructs these conclusions
 — the teleological assumptions about how history works, the transcendental
 assumptions about how imprisoned subjects function — my first response, 
in reality, was not this academic.
What disturbed 
me
 even more than this essay’s facts or its argument is the  
question of how the dead are narrated — how their bodies are glossed. The
 pivotal, mediating figure, the point of transference that introduces this essay, is
 Andre Jones, a black man found hanging by his own shoelace. The section
 introducing his story begins with a subtitle, “Starting on a Shoe String,” a string
 of words that makes Jones’s body
 
the subject of cleverly nuanced academic play.  
What is gained by this painful irreverence, by a pun that works over and
 through a dead man’s body with the cavalier bitterness of a good Gershwin
 song? I think, what am I able to demand of the author of this or any essay, as
 she or he holds open the bodies of others for my
 
gaze? I think, language is dif ­
ficult, and 
objects
 never go into their concepts without leaving something  
behind, without leaving a remainder. But
 
in this essay that so appalls me I find  
something more than a remainder: I find too many remains. There are too
 many
 
bodies here, and too little care for them.
However bitterly or acerbically it is meant, the pun “starting on a shoe
­string” functions too glibly
 
to lighten the burden of writing about the dead. In  
taking a body already disfigured by violence and making a “figure” out of it —
 a trope, a pun, a sleight-of-word — the author relocalizes Jones’s death, his
 bodily remains, within the entrepreneurial space of academic play. Elsewhere
 in the essay this disfiguration seems even more 
dangerous:
For Andre Jones, jail
 
hanging may have been a  somatic form of cultural  crit ­
icism attesting to the incontestable reality of the pain and torture of Mis
­sissippi jails. But as Scarry would predict, the “language” of this hanging
 event is not entirely
 
clear. You cannot  be sure what the hanging is “saying”  
about the pain of the inmate. This linguistic problem calls into question
 the source and agency of Jones’s unmaking.
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Scarry’s work emphasizes the importance of reading the body as a text,
 
a valuable approach to the story of Jones’s death. The posture of Andre
 Jones emphasizes the body in a way that cancels the contents of the world:
 the suspension of a body from the 
shower
 bar, dangling like fruit, fleshy,  
pulpy, a 
liquefying
 solid. The human involved is reduced from a sentient  
being into a mere body, matter, the object of gravity’s pull. In the case of
 Jones, a single shoestring unmakes the made, 
for
 in his world shoes were  
both a possession of 
status
 and a position of plight, as in “I wouldn’t want  
to be in your shoes.” His hanging synthesizes 
each
 connotation so that the  
plight of pain becomes objectified and he 
becomes,
 like the shoe, some ­
thing that dangles from a string. Andre Jones the sentient being 
disappears and is represented by a black Nike hightop sneaker, the kind young urban
 blacks sometimes kill for. Because of shoes, some urban teenagers kill oth
­ers; by means of shoes, do some jailed urban teenagers kill themselves?
 Andre Jones did not kill for shoes but instead died by 
means
 of them, his 
Mississippi-made body transformed i to both a shoe and a field of crisis.
 Unfortunately
 
for Mississippi, however, the hanging  of Andre Jones has the  
appearance of bearing the antecedent state insignia of lynching. (115)
These paragraphs ride on the same somatic techniques that the Pretoria muse
­
um exhibit uses to vivify Steven Biko’s death; they swerve between a heroiciz-
 ing classicism and the prurient anarchy of
 
the grotesque. The author begins  
with a small gesture of heroism. If Jones has killed himself, this act becomes a
 form of “somatic cultural criticism”: that is, in death his body is wedded to the
­ory;
 
it becomes a visceral act of cultural critique (it is “like”  a  cultural critic’s acts  
of cultural criticism). But almost immediately Gildea retracts this violent yok
­ing of unlike subjectivities, and his text moves dialectically
 
to acknowledge that  





to a  halt, at least until “theory” can come to the rescue. To cope with  
the subject’s silence, the critic must borrow figures that permit the reading of
 this body as text:  
"
a valuable approach.” (But  valuable for whom? Who prof ­
its when someone’s else’s body is turned into a set of tropes to be perused as 
an academic commodity? Here even silence can become a surplus value the read
­er can reap.)
Here two different 
modes
 of problematic thinking become visible. First,  
this paragraph appropriates figures from Billie Holliday’s “Strange Fruit,” a bit
­ter 
song
 about the effects of lynching and mob violence in the postbellum  
South. In the initial verse of this song, death is almost made bearable — it is
 lightened — by displacing the traumas endured by once-living men onto an
 aestheticized object from the natural world: “Southern trees bear strange fruit,
 / Blood on the leaves and 
red
 at the root. / Black bodies swinging in the south ­
ern breeze, / Strange fruit hanging from the poplar trees.” But while “men” and
 “fruit” are so easily linked, what the 
song
 points to again and again is the dis ­
tance between the living metaphor and the dead body. That is, the fact of dis
­placement (the way that the personification of “fruit” is so eerily mapped onto
 the de-anthropomorphized bodies of black men) in itself makes a political
 statement. It suggests that these bodies have already endured such displace
­
8
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ment long before their death. In the pre-civil-rights South, African Ameri
­
cans, whether dead or alive, were barred from crossing the symbolic threshold
 into personification; from the perspective of the dominant culture they were
 forced to hover 
in
 the uncivil space between human and inhuman worlds. As  
Hortense Spillers describes the lives of black women during this period:
Slavery did not transform the black female into an embodiment of carnal
­
ity at all, as the myth of the black woman would tend to convince us. She
 became instead the principal point of passage between the human and non
­human world. Her issue became the focus of a cunning difference . . . the
 route by which the dominant
 
male decided the distinction between human ­
ity and  
"
other” . . . [decided that] black is vestibular to culture. In other  
words, the black person mirrored for the society around her what a human
 being was not. (76)
Billie Holliday’s song defines the hanging 
bodies
 of black men as another  point  
of impossible passage. That something as heavy
 
as a body can  be made so light,  
so irrelevant, so metaphoric, is the first ironic point of this song. The second is
 that this very lightness is only possible because African-American men have
 already been de-anthropomorphized by white society. Thus Holliday’s allusion
 to the lynched bodies of
 
black men as ‘strange fruit” resounds so caustically  
because these men have died several deaths. As metaphors, the song
'
s spectral  
bodies offer a doubly mimetic space, the frightening specter of “emphasis
 added” to injury. This 
song
 not only calls out to the traumas endured by black  
men but 
opens
 a space for exploring the dehumanization (the lost personhood  
or
 
personification) suffered by the African-American community at large. The  
re-imaging and de-animation of black 
bodies
 as “fruit for the crows to pluck”  
offers a commentary not only on the practice of lynching but on a
 
white meta ­
physic that makes blackness vestibular to humanity.
My central critique of Gildea’s “reading” of Andre Jones’s body is that his
 
metaphors are complicit in rather than critical of these older acts of dehuman
­ization. He 
ignores
 what the Holliday song knows too well: namely, that the  
dangers implicit in the rhetoricization of a black man’s body can have material
 effects
 
—  that the depersonification of African Americans is an ongoing, repet ­
itive stratagem within American history. The argument his essay proposes —
 that
 
in creating his own hanging death, Andre Jones “objectifies” himself on his  
own shoestring — seems too self-serving. In “Estranged Fruit” men are made
 into metaphors so they can be harvested by the critic.
To put this somewhat differently, the racially-marked bodies of Gildea’s
 
essay seem all too available for acts of rhetorical seizure and conceptual vio
­lence. Gildea begins his essay
 
with the deaths of two black men, Andre Jones  
and
 
David Scott Campbell, even though he wants to argue that the inmate “sui ­
cides” in Mississippi’s jails are evenly distributed among black and white males
 as well as among black and white females. Color is esssentially effaced as a topic
 here, but it is all too present as the spectacular site of
 
exoticism and readerly  
transference. What part does race (or ethnicity or sexual or religious prefer
­ence) play in making bodies available for academic consumption? For example,
9
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in the paragraphs just cited, Jones’s body is said to cancel the world. (But does
 
it? For whom? For his parents? His peers?) A string of metaphors follows, as
 if the body of a hanged man could dangle from a series of tropes, transformed
 from fruit to shoe to ghetto tough: a persona killed (or killing) because of his
 shoes; a person who is already depersonified.
And
 
this is my second critique of the problematic thinking that makes these 
lurid figures possible.1 While "world-canceling” is meant to suggest
 
the world ­
negating capacities of suicide itself, this cancellation of the world, offers a limit
 case for examining what happens when we read synecdochally, when a 
body becomes a “text,” is excerpted from its context, and then asked to re-represent
 the meaning
 
of this dissipated context. That  is, this illusion of world-canceling  
marks the spot where Gildea’s own prose starts to saturate the dead man's “evac
­uated” space; this is the beginning of a series of phrases that attempt to make
 trauma available for a certain kind of argument, a certain kind of consumption.
 What does it mean to turn bodies into rhetoric?
Let me give a brief overview. First, we are told that
 
Jones’s dead body is  
hanging, like fruit, like the hanged men from the 
old
 Billie Holliday song. But  
if it’s “like” a fruit, it’s also not like a fruit at all: a shower head is not a branch,
 a shoe string is not a twig, and Jones lived and died in a postmodern era, when
 even the Ku Klux 
Klan
 has its own web site. So, the author concludes, this  
body is not such “strange fruit” after all; instead, it is “like” a shoe — it hangs
 from a shoe string, doesn’t it? And “young urban 
blacks
” sometimes kill each  
other for their shoes — that’s common knowledge, isn’t it? — whether such
 “knowledge” is relevant to Jones’s life or not. (Notice how cultural context
 returns in this selective way as the outgrowth of the textualization of Jones’s
 body, of the selective pressures of a chosen field of synecdoches). Well, if kids
 kill
 
themselves for shoes, then why not  with  shoes? All this demands  is the  shift  
of one preposition — not a big deal. The body becomes — not itself—but an
 effect of reading. It is transformed into an Ovidian site that can be manipulat
­ed for the sake of a certain form of academic mastery.
What I 
am
 trying to show, in crudely approximating the logic that drives  
these two paragraphs, is the way this narrative mimics a set of techniques that
 cultural critics use all the time, techniques that cultural 
studies
 borrows from  
anthropology and anthropology borrows from literary criticism: a method
 James Clifford calls “textualization.” (It occurs in “Estranged Fruit” when a
 young man’s body is excerpted from both its jailhouse and neighborhood con




“is the process through which unwritten behav ­
ior, speech, beliefs, oral tradition, and ritual come to be marked as a corpus, a
 potentially meaningful
 
ensemble separated out from an immediate discursive or  
performative situation” (38). This corpus has extraordinarily mobile and
 metaphoric properties. By extrapolating one detail from a cultural context and
 making that detail into a “text” — a site for interpretation, for reading — what
 emerges is a gathering of synecdoches that can be read in isolation from their
 dialogic field, allowing a world to reemerge under the control of images that the
 critic herself chooses to emphasize. In other words, a part is used to reconstruct
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the whole, but with content and context blown away. When  
context reemerges, it comes not as itself, but as a narrative spun out of the
 interpreter-anthropologists poesis, her own acts of making.
The dangers of this spinning are obvious. That is, by extrapolating one
 
detail from its “background” and designating that detail as a meaning-filled
 “text,” what 
emerges
 is the invention of a tropological field that grows out of  
the abstracted detail itself. Even more disconcerting, the evacuation of a par
­ticular context can be disguised in tropes of abundance that both dehumanize
 the body and make it into an object so we can continue to “read” it — that is,
 to recreate it by piling metaphors and similes upon it so that it becomes some
­thing other than “itself.”
This observation poses an additional problem. In perusing Andre Jones’s
 
death we can say that there is, of course, no “self” 
here
 at all. What happens  
when the corpus is really a corpse? You’
d
 think the dead would be silent, over-  
easy, eager for the materiality bestowed by some critic’s “texting.” But the very
 opposite seems true, for the invocation of “Strange Fruit” has already sum
­moned the borrowed figures of the dead into the margins of this essay — and
 once they are summoned, they will not bow down. “Scent of magnolia, sweet
 and fresh / Then the sudden smell of burning
 
flesh. / Here’s a  fruit for the crows  
to pluck. / For the rain to gather, for the wind to suck. / For the sun to rot, for
 the tree to drop. / Here’s a strange and bitter
 
crop.” Holliday’s song is acrid and  
heavy; it conjures the weight of the dead to testify around the “corpus” of
 another hanged man. Later, I want to address the problematic use of “Strange
 Fruit” as metaphoric space for imagining “the new” (here, as a set of metaphors
 that Gildea uses to construct an alternate theory of violent death while in cus
­
tody).
 But for now, let me simply suggest that the ways in which this song is  
made formulaic and the 
subject
 of refutation has the effect of making the  
specter emerge even more palpably.
What does it mean to turn bodies into rhetoric? Rhetoric seems complic
­
it in evacuating these dead men’s worlds; it cancels the brutal facticity of the
 body’s 
local
 fate for the appropriative potentials of metaphor. At the same time,  
some form of troping, of de- or re-anthropomorphizing, is inevitable whenev
­er we speak of the dead. Given the fact that the dead can only live as tropes, as
 figures, 
for
 the remainder of this essay I want to explore the repercussions of  
this problem 
for




How do we account for, and respond to, the weight of the dead and the  
potential dissipation of the body in writing?
2)
 
What does it mean to make the dead into “texts”? Or, as my colleague  
Marlon Ross has asked, what are the 
dangers




What is the relation between reading (or writing) for pleasure and the  
specter? Marx suggests that the dead — not as the facts but as the “figures” of
 history — 
feed
 revolutions: their bodies are given leading roles in political  
movements and documents; their speciality offers the metaphoric foundation
 of the new.  If the specter provides the tropes we push off from, or push away
 from, in order to suggest other, more utopian orders, what can we conclude
11
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about the relation between the spectral and the pleasure of “the new”? 
Or,
 to  
make a more local intervention, how does excitement about new ideas (part of
 Journal x
'
s motive in creating a journal focused on pleasure) depend on the  
specter, rest on the spectral properties — the tropics — of the dead?
4)
 
Finally, what is the status of griefwork and the thematics of loss within  
the fin de siècle academy? How should we respond to, and in what tones should
 
we
 write about, our obsessive recoveries of subsemantic histories? Are we  
inventing new “brands” of transgenerational haunting? Or is academic con
­sumerism an inevitable outgrowth of the culture of late capitalism that 




The Weight of the Dead
The Communist Manifesto begins with a ghost: “Ein Gespenst geht um in
 
Europa — a specter is haunting Europe.” But in Specters of
 
Marx Derrida stalks  
the ghost of Marx himself. He wants to conjure not only with the lost ghosts
 of communism but
 
with Marx’s own obsession with specters:
Men make their own history [ihre eigene Geschichte} but
 
they do not make it  
just as they please [aus freien Stücken]; they do not make it under circum
­
stanc
es chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encoun ­
tered, given and transmitted from the past [überlieferten Umständen]. The
 tradition of all the dead generations [aller toten Geschlecter] weighs [lastet]
 
like
 a nightmare on the brain of the living. (Quoted in Derrida 108)
In calling out to the specter we encounter a new kind of
 
nightmare: not the  
gothic terror of being haunted by the dead, but the greater terror of not being
 haunted, of ceasing to feel the weight of past generations in one’s bones. That
 is, the words we use to hold the dead, to call out to them, are too porous, too
 leaky. Even the English version of Marx’s phrase, “the tradition of all the dead
 generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living,” has more heft
 in the German. In Marx’s original text, the specter “‘lastet wie ein
 
Alp,’ that is,  
weighs like one of those ghosts that give nightmares; the French translation
 reads simply 
'
pese d’un poids tres lourd,’ weighs very heavily; as often happens  
in translations, the ghost
 
drops off into oblivion or,  in the best of cases, it is dis ­
solved into approximate 
figures
” (Derrida 108).
The problem haunting my essay is precisely the danger of this dissolution
 of the dead into “approximate figures.” Take, for example, my own attempt to
 invoke the ghost in the paragraph on Steven Biko that begins this essay. Here
 I want to instantiate a physical dignity for the dead, to invoke the terrors of
 imprisonment and choicelessness (the nightmare weight that descends upon
 Biko) as well as the forces of history that Biko, in 
his
 political actions, sought  
to lift. I want some portion of this weight to descend on the reader’s body, to
 
creat
e a burdensome space for thinking about the relationship between repre ­
sentational melancholy and political praxis.
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But as soon as I open this scene, something else starts to happen; I remo
­
bilize the specter for a different set of rhetorical ends . Planning to talk later in
 this essay about what happens to black men in prisons, I ask the invocation of
 “Biko” to set the scene. His body lends itself to the
 
project of making this essay  
into a well-working object, an echo chamber 
for
 my most urgent ideas. In the  
midst of such considerations, where are
 
we, how close to the ghost? And what  
happens to the 
work,
 the figuration of mourning? I write a sentence, then  
strike it out: “I wanted to name my son after Steven Biko, but couldn’t, didn’t
 — a martyr’s name. But aren’t half the 
names
 in the white man’s canon mar ­
tyr’s names — just buried under centuries of overuse?” It sounds too personal,
 it breaks the tone, draws too much attention to my own psychic investments in
 this project when I want to draw out something more serious. But one of my
 criticisms of Gildea’s essay is precisely the question of transference. In making
 a body into a text, what investments does the cultural critic bring to her work,
 and when should they become visible?
Meanwhile, I’m looking over my shoulder and thinking about audience:
 
how well is 
my
 interpretation taking hold? Am I doing  better than other  inter ­
pretations? But before resolving this problem my efforts to invoke the specter
 are taken over
 
by the sheer delight of thinking, by  the spectacular lure of analy ­
sis. Invoking the ghost, I become half-acrobatic, take pleasure in associative
 vertiginousness and move farther from the 
lure
 of the specter. That is, the  very  
act of thinking about the spectral object makes it even more spectral. Theodor
 Adorno defines the problems that the thinking subject encounters in each 
act of definition or analysis 
in
 his Negative Dialectics:
The spell cast by the subject becomes equally a spell cast over the subject.
 
Both spells are driven by the Hegelian fury of disappearance. The subject
 is spent and impoverished in its categorial performance; to be able to 
define and articulate what it confronts . . . the subject must dilute itself to the
 point
 
of mere universality, for the sake of the objective validity of those def ­
initions. It must cut
 
loose from, itself as much as from the cognitive object,  
so that this object will be reduced to its concept, according to plan. The
 objectifying 
subject
 contracts into a point of abstract reason, and finally  
into logical noncontradictoriness. (139)
This is a ponderous passage containing a crucial idea. First Adorno marks the
 
impoverishment of the subject, of the “texting” person. In seeking definitions
 or articulations with “objective validity” the subject cuts herself loose from the
cognitive object. This object,
 
in turn, is cut  loose from everything except for its  
"concept,”
 
its dematerialized idea. In writing or thinking we experience a need  
to turn things into concepts so that they can be spoken about. But this very
 need casts a spell that breeds disappearance: both subject and object are dilut
­ed and spent when they are described under a common denominator. Both
 object and subject “contract,” in a simultaneous disappearance of two different
 contexts. This is the very problem that the double-bodied exhibit 
in
 the Pre ­
toria museum is trying — so awkwardly — to make intelligible. Neither of
 these bodies allows Biko to haunt us sufficiently; each flirts with the problem
 of disappearance.
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I seem to have come to a binary impasse: either the ghost speaks, or we
 
must endure — that is, become complicit in — its silence, the attenuation of
 the dead within the oblivion of approximate figures, figures designed to com
­municate but always encountering the emptiness of the concept, the flatness of
 theory, the excess of lurid projections, or the instrumentality of the body made
 spectacle. But there is a third possibility, one narrated by Homer in The
 Odyssey, in the scenes where Odysseus journeys to Hades to talk with the dead.
 Abandoning Circe for Ithaca, 
Odysseus
 is faced with another detour; he  
requires “the strengthless 
heads
 of  the perished dead” to learn “how to make  
your way home on the sea where the fish swarm” (10.540). Faced with this
 journey, “the inward heart 
in
 me was broken, / and I sat down on the bed and  
cried, nor did the heart in me / wish to go on living any longer, nor to look on
 the sunlight. / But
 
when I had glutted myself with rolling about and weeping,  
/ then at last I spoke aloud” (496-9). Odysseus must find a form of speech not
 overburdened with grief, with figures of glut or excess. In fact, his strategy for
 getting the dead to speak will involve a similar self-regulation. Approaching
 Hades, Odysseus digs a pit and pours libations for the dead, “first / honey
 mixed with milk, then a second pouring of sweet
 
wine” (519-20). Finally this  
pit is filled with the blood of the living:
Now
 
when, with sacrifices and prayers, I had so entreated  
the hordes of the dead, I took the sheep and cut their throats
 over the pit, and the dark-clouding blood ran in, and the souls
 of the perished dead gathered to the place, 
up
 out of Erebos, brid s, and  
young unmarried men, and long-suffering elders,
 virgins, tender and with the sorrows of young hearts upon them,
 and many fighting men killed in battle, stabbed with brazen
 spears, still carrying their bloody armor upon them.
These came swarming around my pit from every direction
 
with inhuman clamor, and green fear took hold of me. (11.34-43)
This “dark-clouding” blood becomes the locus of a bizarre
 
plenitude; it provides  
three different conundrums for thinking about the
 
“approximate figures” of the  
dead.
First, why is this blood necessary? It would seem that the dead can only
 
speak when they partake of the things of this world. If the images clothing the
 dead are important, it is because these figures are the gateway to their avail
­ability. At the same time, the dress that we bestow upon the phantom is
 inevitably our own. That is, the trace of the specter
'
s speech resides neither in  
the dead's wished-for presence nor in their oblivion, but 
in
 their inevitable  
hybridity. They must be fed on the life
 
blood, the figures of the  present, if they  
are to speak.
And here we come to a second conundrum. Odysseus offers this sacrifice
 
so that the dead can become substantial. But when the phantoms begin to
 swarm, Odysseus instructs his men to draw their
 
swords. Initially, only a hand ­
ful among the restless “hordes of
 
the dead” are allowed to drink; the rest are  
withheld figuration. Here we face the question of both posthumous harm and
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equal access to figuration: how do we choose who can speak, how do we account
 
for the missing persons of the dead? This gatekeeping function or archival cen
­sorship provided by historical narrative is also the source of Walter Benjamins
 famous call for a materialist, interventionist history, 
one
 that reestablishes a  
possible voice for “those
 
who are lying prostrate,” that  refuses to celebrate either  
the victor's monuments or his specters. “To articulate the past historically does
 not mean to recognize it "the way it really was’ 
(Ranke).
 It means to seize hold  
of a memory s it flashes up at a moment of danger.... Only that historian
 
will  
have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly convinced
 that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy
 
if he wins. And this enemy  
has not ceased to be victorious” (255). For Benjamin “the way it really was” is
 always an invention of the victor’s culture. We find an example in Z Magazine
 
in
 a parodic portrait of an anchorman reading the evening news: “This just in,  
a Pakistani jet crashed into a Libyan cruise ship killing all 
5,000
 passengers  
instantly.” In the next frame he looks irritated: “I don’t get it . . . where’s the
 story?” A hand juts into the frame with an update and suddenly the anchorman
 reads with renewed emphasis: “There were three Americans on board! Oh the
 Humanity!” (17). For the phantom to speak, it must participate in the telos of
 Odysseus’s journey, in his country-seeking quest.
Given this telos, is it surprising that, among those originally withheld 
figu­
ration and left in the margins, is Odysseus’s mother? When Odysseus sees her,
 “I broke into tears at the sight of her and my
 
heart pitied her, / but even so, for  
all my thronging sorrow, I would not / let her draw near the blood until I had
 questioned Teiresias” (11.87-9). When his mother speaks, Odysseus wants
 nothing more than to hold her: “Mother, why 
will
 you not wait for me, when  
I am trying
 
/ to ho d you, so that even in Hades with our arms embracing / we  
can both take the satisfaction of dismal mourning? / Or are
 
you nothing but an  
image?” (210-14). What kind of mourning is this? Why does Odysseus, who
 at first refuses to talk to his mother, now long for her embrace? In addition to
 the question of gatekeeping, Homer 
opens
 a space for meditating upon the  
image as a way
 
of both  “holding” and “holding  off” the material presence of the  
dead.3
In The Practice of Everyday Life, Michel de Certeau suggests that we are
 
always at the margins of
 
Hades, always surrounded by meditative spaces that  
hold open (and 
speak
 for) the dead. “There is no place that is not haunted by  
many different spirits hidden there in silence, spirits one can "invoke’ or not.
 Haunted places are the only ones people can live 
in
” (108). But in a letter that  
questions these e chantments (at least as they were depicted in a recent essay
 collection on The Geography of
 
Identity), my friend Richard Godden demurs:
Concerning your account of place as haunted with the residues of wasted
 
work: the problem is that ghosts are the evacuees of memory and that to
 obtain substance they must be shed 
by
 the actions (and thoughts) of those  
who live. Unless spectres materialize through lived institutions, they will
 make no path, leave no track and evaporate. I have always been simultane
­ously impressed and skeptical over Volosinov’s claim that “no word forgets
 its path” — would that this were so. Surely the linguist meant “
no
word  
should be permitted to forget its path.”
15




In search of such memories, what forgiveness, what reprieve? In recognizing
 
that every space is haunted, we are still at one remove from the enormity of
 transgenerational haunting. It is only when someone bears witness or gives the
 specter its due (its space of political and institutional articulation) that the
 empty images of the dead can be held up and held open. Given the importance
 (and impotence) of writing from within the complexity of our own killing
 fields, is “textualization” really so bad as a strategy? Isn’t the task of abstraction
 a potential response, a valiant attempt to answer Benjamin’s plea for a politi
­cally responsible history, one that
 
reaches out deliberately,  blindly, to respond  to  
a moment of danger?
2.
 
Doing Anthropology with a Dead Subject
To answer, I want to look at a series of books that ask whether it is possible to
 
theorize other bodies, other cultures, while holding open a space for mourning,
 for the lost object. What relationship to theory 
will
 help us explore our repet ­
itive love for the specter, our continual pleasure in being haunted
 else’s dead?
E. Valentine Daniel refigures these questions in Charred Lullabies: Chapters
 
in an Anthropography of Violence, a book that 
frames
 a new anthropological dis ­
course to describe the results of nationalist violence in Sri Lanka. Daniel began
 the research for this volume in 1982, when he planned a trip to collect folk
 songs by Tamil women who worked on Sri Lanka’s tea estates. But instead of
 lullabies, Daniel encountered a country torn apart by 
an
 unstoppable conflict  
between Tamil minorities a d a Sinhalese majority. He begins Charred Lulla
­bies by invoking the results of this ongoing war:
Many
 
have died. To say  more is to simplify, but to fathom the statement  is  
also to make the fact
 
bearable. Tellipali, Nilaveli, Manippay, Boosa, Dollar  
Farm, Kokkadicholai — mere place-names of another time — have been
 transformed into names of places spattered with blood and mortal residue.
 . . . Many have died. How to give 
an
 account of these shocking events 
without giving in to a desire to shock? And more important, what does it
 mean to give such an account? That is the burden of this book. (3)




the narrative strategies of anthropology but its deepest structures. In con ­
fronting atrocities, what good are methods or theories "designed to enhance”
 our understanding of coherent social units such as castes or clans? These ordi
­nary, structure-seeking explanations "had suddenly become inappropriate,”
 forcing the anthropologist to turn to more urgent questions. First, how does
 one write an ethnography of violence "without its becoming a pornography of
 violence”? Theory seems to offer one alternative. It provides a flattening-out
 of affect: abstraction instead of prurience. But theory also extracts a cost,
 namely, "the price of betraying those victims of violence (and in at least one
 instance, a perpetrator of 
violence)
 who wished to communicate with the  
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anthropologist and through him to the outside world some part of the experi
­
ence of the passion and the pain of violence in its brutal immediacy” (4).
The burden of describing the pain of another is daunting, and Daniel
 
describes the impotence any writer feels 
in
 the face of this demand. A possible  
solution would be to do nothing. But is this an adequate response to the
 anthropologist’s dialogic contract with his or her subjects? The questions go
 on. How does one protect the anonymity of storytellers whose confessions 
will single them out as informers? Will Daniel himself be able to return to Sri
 Lanka after writing so frankly about the costs of civil war and human torture?
On these several points, Daniel judges his book a failure — the prurience
 
of violence leaks in and theory is advanced
 
with a vengeance. But  in this delib ­
erate space of imperfection something haunting emerges. By refusing the easy
 marriage of theory to world, what we get is a nervous system, an anthropology
 anxious about its own logos, a writing that recognizes its own 
status
 as writing,  
as“anthropography.”4 For Daniel any theory pretending to account for the 
grim facticity of violence or death must stand both under and apart from the mate
­riality
 
it theorizes. Interpretation must proceed without complacency about its  
own accuracy; theory must never explain or evacuate “its” events. Instead, they
 must come together as “jarring juxtapositions.”
While Val Daniel opens a space for contemplating the performance of a
 
“nervous” ethnography, I want to open a coequal space for becoming nervous
 about the strategies of reading implicit in some forms of cultural criticism. To
 situate the need for a metapraxis both bold in its interventions and 
edgy
 with  
stutterance, I want to 
provide
 a quick  overview of the historiography of ethnog ­
raphy that James Clifford supplies in The Predicament of Culture, in which
 “authoritative,” “interpretive,” and “discursive” anthropology offer three differ
­ent sites for interpolating a cultural field.
Clifford 
begins
 by mapping the techniques deployed by the ethnographer  
of the 1920s and 30s, 
an
 empiricist who embraced the fiction of an “authorita ­
tive anthropology.” Defying the contradictory status inherent in the role of
 “participant observer,” confident that the monograph could control the dialog
­ic textures of other cultures, anthropology became a social “science” based on
 the belief that social systems could be abstracted from empirical evidence —
 and that these systems were separable from the anthropologist’s own aesthetic
 practice. Since observation 
could
 amass a discrete body of data to get at social  
truth, the eccentricities and discriminating habits of fieldworkers went unsung.
 That is, the authoritative anthropologist made herself into a specter. Without
 noticing, 
she
 provided another culture’s phantasmatic ground.
In the
 
work  of Clifford Geertz and Company the field shifts toward “inter ­
pretive anthropology” and the 
figurative
 nature of “the poetic processes by  
which cultural objects’ are invented and treated as meaningful” comes into
 greater focus (38). We have already seen that “textualization,”
 
an act of abstrac ­
tion in which an event
 
or behavior is separated out from a larger strata of mean ­
ing, comes to 
be
 understood as the “prerequisite to any act of interpretation.”  
But in this system of deliberate poesis, there are also blind spots. Material that
 is excerpted as “text” immediately assumes a stable relation to “context”; there
 is insufficient anxiety about the leap to synecdoche. When texts (parts taken
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for wholes) hold still, the ethnographer can assume the role of the traditional
 
critic: someone “who sees the task at hand as locating the unruly meanings of
 a text in a single coherent intention.” But without problematizing “the actual
­ity of discursive situations and individual interlocutors,” what gets lost is the
 colloquy of the colloquial, the dialogic, the situational basis of all fact-seeking
 interactions. In a sense, there are two contexts missing: the ethnographers’ and
 the informants’.
And so Clifford clamors for 
an
 anthropology of the incommensurable: for  
“discursive anthropology,” a mode of writing concerned with “situations of
 interlocution” (42). Even 
here
 the ground is sticky and the specter may go  
missing. How does one “resist the pull toward authoritative representation of
 the other”? How “to maintain the strangeness of the other voice” as well as the
 quiddities of the exchange that produced that voice? If what emerges in both
 “authoritative” and “interpretive” anthropology
 
is the problem of doing anthro ­
pology not only with abstracted subjects but with a dead or missing anthropol
­ogist, discursive anthropology also has its 
pitfalls.
 In trying to give the subject  
enough headroom, a discrete space of dialogic response, the anthropologist
 compensates with ample quotation. But the danger here is in using quotation
 in a subordinate fashion, as confirming
 
testimony (50). How does one write an  
ethnography
 
where the subject talks back? (Even worse: how does one write  
such an ethnography with the dead?)
Kathleen Stewart’s A Space On the Side of the Road provides delicious if par
­
tial answers. This is a book addressed from the coal mining regions of West
 Virginia, a space lacking monumental stature within an American imaginary
 where “African-American culture has become the talisman of cultural differ
­ence.’” Stewart wants to rethink this dialectic
 
of othering from  within the space  
of 
an
 “Appalachia” texted from both inside and out as a backwater, a space on  
the side of the road. To make this space almost visible, Stewart argues for the
 clashing of epistemologies — “ours and theirs” — and she uses that clash
 repeatedly to reopen “a gap in the theory of culture itself so that we can imag
­ine culture as a process constituted in use.” “Culture” is redefined as a site “hard
 to grasp”; it can 
never
 be found in “the perfect text and the quick textual solu­
tion” (5).
To prevent this fallacy of “perfect texting” Stewart projects a mixture of
 
voices. The rhythms of her book move back and forth between the imperative
 voice — “imagine this, picture that” — and fragrant lists that conjure fragments
 of places. Jumping from someone’s front porch to a meditation on what it
 means to report
 
“place” in this way, Stewart swerves into theory and then back  
again, meditating all along on the arc of her own voice. In reporting dialogue
 she tries to remember the circumstance of the telling, including her own “aggra
­vation” at the “constant proliferation of stories” that
 
will not hold still. Elabo ­
rating on one community’s self-description as “an old timey place,” she conjures
 yards filled with broken washing machines, scraps of metal, and cars belly up;
 she demands that
 
we arrest the gestures of “academic essentialism”: “the desire  
for decontaminated meaning, the need to require that visual, verbal constructs  
yield meaning down to their last detail” (26).
In refusing to galvanize everything “into an order of things” Stewart tries
 
to deflect “transcendent critique long enough to recognize the practices of con-
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cealment and forgetting inherent in all inodes of explanation, description, 
and 
analysis (71). What if, instead of transcendent codes and systems, “there was
 only the anecdote”? What if we refused transcendent theories of culture and
 instead flooded our own markets with contaminating voices? What if every
 academic appropriation grew “nervous 
in
 the wake of its own partial under ­
standings and dense under the weight of its own political unconscious” (210)?
 What then?
Stewart’s call for a nervous system, her refusal of singular, duplicable mod
­
els, makes for breathtaking reading, but what does it suggest about the specter?
 Doing anthropology with a dead 
subject
 already means that one is well outside  
the dialogic, talking with someone who can 
never
 talk back. “Interpretation is  
not interlocution. It does not depend on being in the presence of a speaker”
 (Clifford 39).
I feel this absence most acutely in Feldman’s Formations of Violence, a book
 
on the recent political struggles between Republicans and 
Loyalists
 in North ­
ern Ireland. Here, again and again, terrifying events are torn from their con
­text and
 
“textualized.” Often this involves an extraordinary feeling of violation.  
Feldman anatomizes a scene of violence and then theorizes the psycho-social
 sources of this violence, with little apparent concern for its victims, those
 defiled by inventive brands of territorial fury. At the same time, the very
sub­ject of this book is reflected in its methods. Feldman wants to unpack the
 volatility of violence, the way it escapes and fractures disciplinary structures,
 hacks its way into normative sites of
 
legitimation. A question Formations of  
Violence dodges is, how can we talk about those who are offed by political 
vio­
lence
 without replicating its dehumanizations? Within the apparatus f For ­
mations of Violence, theory itself becomes a kind of torture machine that
 processes the dead like so much odd filigree. And yet Feldman’s insight into
 the particularly virulent world of injustice within Northern Ireland also “legit
­imates” his book’s violent method. We learn that sanctuaries function both to
 “territorialize violence” and to create zones of “reversible violence” that contin
­ually change the terrain of “barricaded communities” (36). The complex 
ethics of “hardmen” (an old breed of Irishmen who handled conflict with fisticuffs)
 changes under the pressures of insurgency and counterinsurgency into the vio
­lent
 
ethos of “gunman” bent on a new species of genocide. Feldman argues that  
the political violence that ricochets throughout the urban environments of the
 Irish North offers an underanalyzed , mode of transcription that “circulates
 codes from one prescribed historiographic surface or agent to another. . . .
 Struggles will 
occur
 over competing transcriptions of the same body,” fractur ­
ing 
any
 vision of the body as “organic” or “natural” and accelerating one’s sense  
of politicized subjectivity (7). In a sense, there is no space for griefwork here
 because this book’s own accelerated rhythm of
 
analysis reenacts the circuit in  




I also want to argue that something like a  “holding” of the violent,  
violating, violated subject also occurs in the nervous interstices between Feld
­man’s own theories and his recorded interviews with IRA activists imprisoned
 by the British government. Here we find a particular intensive example of “tex-
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 example, Feldman describes the prisons rectal exams as “a ceremony  
of defilement and the highest expression of the prison regime’s optical colon
­ization of the captive body” — returning us to the question of the pun and
 whether the academic
 
writer should abandon the temptation to hypertextualize  
an already violated body (174). To refuse to mark this “colonic” space — that
 is, to refuse 
to
 notice or emphasize a pun already half-present, half-visible,  
describing the prisoners’ “colonized” anuses — opens a site of readerly risibili
­ty; once noted the pun is so obvious, so very much there. And yet to cite it is
 to make the bodies of others too available to the reader’s objectifying gaze.
 That is, to pun about rectal extrusion and intrusion (to make the context of
 bodily invasion and privation so playful) is to risk excessive figuration. But not
 to mark this space of punning violation seems just as reprehensible. As Feld
­man argues, for Republican prisoners reduced by
 
this continued defilement, the  
colon became wonderfully powerful, allowing colonized bodies to fight back
 using the only means available — colon-ically.
The story behind these
 
vagrant figures is textured and complex. Beginning  
in 1976 the “Blanketmen” (those IRA prisoners Feldman interviewed who
 refused to wear prison uniforms that could divest them of their political status
 by labeling them common “criminals”) began their terrible vigil. When prison
 authorities refused to grant them political standing, numbers of men lived for
 years divested of clothing, shivering in coarse blankets, their nakedness a
 
polit ­
ical protest against continued deterritorialization. But without the protection
 of everyday clothing, these men became extraordinarily vulnerable. They were
 terrorized by guards who had easy access to their bodies, so that every available
 opening became a portal for excavation. Responding to repeated beatings and
 brutal searches of their anal cavities whenever they used the latrines, prisoners
 began to cover the walls of their
 
cells with their own feces — to stink the guards  
out.
Feldman’s thick descriptions of these atrocities suggest a mode of creative
 
interpretation stretched past the limit:
The prisoners’
 
refusal to  wear the uniform has been the first interruption of  
optical circuits. The guards responded by transforming nakedness into an
 obvious surrogate tool of visual degradation in place of institutional cloth
­ing. The No Wash Protest by the prisoners reclothed their naked bodies
 with a new and repellent surface of resistance. The fecal cell, which the
 guards tended to avoid and mainly entered to inflict quick terror, also inter
­rupted compulsory visibility. In its soiled condition the cell was no longer
 a unidimensional and totally transparent optical stage. The stained walls
 and the stench endowed the cells with a sensory opacity, resistant depth,
 and blackness within which the prisoners could shelter. There was a strong
 analogue between the hiding of contraband by the prisoners in their rectal
 cavity and the withdrawal of the Blanketmen into the repelling depths of
 the scatological cell. Denied the surfaces of the
 
inmate’s body and the inte ­
rior of the inmate’s cell by fecal defilement, the prison regime extended its
 optic to the colon-ization of the physical interior of the prisoner with the
 rectal mirror search. (175)
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Here, I would argue, the practice of “texting” may go too far, but it also fails to
 
go far enough. That is, Feldman s own colonic text defamiliarizes and disgorges
 a context so habitually violent that words can barely contain it. In stretching
 one
'
s figurative capacities on behalf of bodies also stretched to the limit, in 
inventing puns that insistent
 
on making rhetorical capital out of someone else’s  
body by means of an extravagant and objectifying poesis, Feldman’s text
 becomes frighteningly mimetic. That is, in immersing us so thoroughly, so vis-
 cerally in cloacal
 
politics (running the gamut from highbrow theory to lowbrow  
wordplay), Feldman’s version of “interpretive” anthropology veers deliberately
 off course and 
becomes,
 I would argue, “discursive.” This is thick description  
with an alienation-effect thrown in: rhetorical cavities held 
wide,
 figures vio ­
lent
 
and awkward, attempting to make  readable (and therefore disruptable?) the  
space of the all too terrible and strange.
In criticizing the hard-troping, theory-hungry
 
bent of Feldman’s prose, I’m  
also arguing that its “evacuation” of griefwork or mourning is oddly compensat ­
ed for by Feldman’s own far-fetched and farcical figurations — images that jolt
 us out of a too redemptive, too stultifying
 
pathos. Given this self-contradicting  
conclusion, however, why do I object so strenuously when Gildea constructs
 equally “creative” and objectifying figures to inscribe the mute surfaces of Mis
­sissippi’s dead?
My objection is this: while Feldman tries to find a space to reinscribe the
 
fecal contexts deliberately created by his informants, Gildea participates in a
 form of cultural criticism that doesn’t recognize its own lack of information:
 namely, the complexities of doing anthropology with a dead subject who can
­not talk back. In the face of this silence Gildea creates a system that forgets to
 be nervous about its own certainties:
A convict who commits suicide out of the depths of despondency is an
 
artist enacting a dream of expressive freedom upon his or her own body. In
 the complex creativity of these forty-nine men and women, you can see a
 reenactment of the whole history of human thought and art. .. . They per
­ceived another form of sleep in their bedsheets. They found a new way to
 wear their old jeans. (132)
[S]elf-violence 
in
 jail . . . needs to be witnessed to be validated as art. In  
large part because of the debate over their authorship and their journalistic  
depiction as unmakings, the Mississippi jail hangings have not been pre
­sented to a public audience as works of 
art.
 Once revealed as makings, 
however, the power of their iconic imagery rises before you. It speaks of
 stillness, of liminality
 
and resistance. This is more than giving the finger to  
the establishment, or burning the flag, this is offering a dead body as an
 installation piece in a disciplinary space designed to be utterly devoid of
 artistic expression. (133)




but as self-texting integers (the ultimate fantasy of the body as text, of a  
body eager for the critic’s resistant readings). Those who have died ambigú-
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ously in jail become death artists, deliberate artificers of their own transcen
­
dental critique.
But where are the voices of
 
Gildea’s informants, where is his nervous sys ­
tem? To make such a grand argument out of anything but thin air, the cultur
­al critic needs to cover a great 
deal
 of empirical ground, spending time in at  
least two different material contexts: in the streets, houses, and offices where
 incarcerated subjects roamed before their incarceration, and in the inferno of
 Mississippi’s jails. Otherwise the dead offer a too timely Rorschach for the
 writer’s own fantasies — especially those deaths whose causes remain ambigu
­ous. Any ventriloquism or versioning of these now spectral lives must be large
­ly theoretical or imaginary — and must acknowledge the potential arrogance
 and inaccuracies of its own hoped-for theories. Might
 
we not see in these still  
bodies subjects who, meeting themselves on the way to jail, become frightened,
 
confused,
 fragmented, insufficient — suggesting deaths that are just messy and  
meaningless rather than blithely agential and perverse? Might we not hear, in
 the margins of this essay, the murmurs of bodies that do not speak, because they
 did not ask to be unmade but were tortured or murdered or pushed into sui
­cide? What kind of “installation space” would this make? “Estranged Fruit”
 needs to stutter here, to explore the possibility that some of these forty-nine
 men and women might experience their “texting” as posthumous harm, might
 not consent to
 
the critic’s own figurations. Without this discursive doubt, with ­
out an excavation of the critic’s own transferential need to reanimate the dead
 “as art,” the critical ecstasy and self-certainty
 
that spin off these spectral bodies  
tells us too much. It creates the possibility that these hanged bodies tell us
 more about Gildea’s own investments, and still more about the easy commodi
­fication of the dead in the face of a
 
critic’s own desire for an “installation piece.”
3.
 
8c 4. The Academy and the Commodification of Loss, or the Dead as the  
Source of the New
The source for this essay has been a gap, a space on the side of the road, in the
 
margins of the first issue of Journal x
 
where I lost myself two months ago and  
started writing. Turning from Gildea’s penultimate essay 
on
 hanged men to  
Gregory Ulmer’s playful and erudite “Exhibit X: Hoopla Dreams,” I felt lost.
 Is it permissible to make this trek from trauma to pleasure by just turning a
 page? What is the status of academic consumerism, of a world of words where
 we can channel-surf from trauma to pleasure and back to trauma again with so
 little cost?
Trying to reflect upon this discontinuity, I can recognize these feelings as
 
something perpetual; they recur, for instance, during those dim moments of
 (pseudo-)consciousness I have while reading The New York Times. I’
m
 horror-  
struck reading an article about Mexico, or Dakar, or Des Moines, or Dubuque,
 and then I 
glance
 at a body clothed by Lord and Taylor and feel reprieve (or  
anger, or desire, or bare nausea). On a really self-conscious day, shocked at the
 gargantuan presence of these ads next to tiny-print copy about people in pain,
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I think, what kind of world is this? and why do I buy into it? —
 
before butter ­
ing my bagel, folding the paper and putting my thoughts away How can these
 modes of protest and packaging 
coexist
 in the same paper, in the same con ­
sciousness, on the same page? Why is it so customary to mix our pleasures with
 our horrors?




than simply gathering fads and facts about the world. To marry the  
apocalyptic delights of consumerism (brassy women 
in
 boas,, quiet young  
women buckling their 
bras,
 young men staring back at me with their sweet,  
erect nipples) and the chaos of the recently dead or the long dead or the soon
 to be dead is a ritual of nationalizing identity. I open my paper and the family
 across the street opens theirs — or used to, in any event. A sense of collectiv
­ity, of shared facts and shared modes of consumption (of consuming objects
 with our trauma) locates the self in a series of self-disciplining spaces.




 acts of reading construct a community, as, in fact, Journal x  
has begun to construct its community around the question of pleasure:
Journal x instructs its reviewers to make pleasure an explicit criterion 
for 
acceptance and publication, alongside the more orthodox academic criteria
 of originality and responsibility. To poach upon
 
Wallace Stevens’s descrip ­
tion of the 
supreme
 fiction, the Jx essay must give pleasure, must bring the  
thrill of discovery that has always alerted readers to the presence of a first-
 rate intellect engaged in the exploration of new
 
territory and the definition  
of new problems and paradigms. (Kamps and Watson 2)
What does it mean to give an academic audience ‘pleasure”? After thinking
 
hard about “Estranged Fruit” and the anthropography of violence, I’ve begun to
 suspect that such pleasures have a great deal to do with the dead. As Marx
 comments in The Eighteenth Brumaire:
And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and
 
things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such
 periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the
 past to their service and borrow from names, battle cries, and 
costumes
 in  
order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured dis
­guise and this borrowed language. (103)
Marx suggests that “new problems and
 
paradigms” depend upon the dead’s bor ­
rowed names. This 
means
 that  revolutionary thinking is  “never free of anxiety”;  
or, in Derrida’s haunting of Marx, “conjuration is anxiety from the moment it
 calls upon death to invent the quick and to enliven the new, to summon the
 presence of what is not yet there” (Derrida 108-9). I would 
add
 that such nar ­
ratives seek an infusion of pleasure 
by
 instigating a powerful and satisfying  
“out-sourcing” of pain, an observation based on the self-gratifying cling-ons of
 late commodity culture. The Nike swoosh manufactured under subhuman con
­ditions in Vietnam, the Barbie dolls made in Malaysian sweatshops, represent
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an ultimate out-sourcing of the pain and alienation of labor that a “flexible”
 
economy makes possible. Do 
academic
 communities that are pleasure-based  
work
 
in a similar way? At the  very  least, the out-sourcing of pain into the trau ­
matic narratives we read and write so freely may have the effect of
 
creating a  
safely pleasurable source of self-shattering.
In thinking about The Eighteenth 
Brum
aire, Derrida makes two more obser ­
vations. First, those dead generations who weigh so thoroughly upon the
 “brains of revolutionaries” have a severe spectral density. “To weigh (lasten) is
 also to charge, tax, impose, indebt, accuse, assign, 
enjoin.
 And the more life  
there is, the graver the specter of the other becomes, the heavier its imposition.
 And the more the living have to answer for 
it.
 To answer  for the  dead, to respond  
to
 
the dead... in the absence of any certainty or symmetry” (109). But  this debt  
of responsiveness to spectral thinking creates a strange paradox. The more “the
 new” demands change or crisis, “the more one has to convoke the old, ‘borrow’
 from it.” The spirit of revolution depends upon, even as it tries to repudiate, his­tory’s specters. Facing this obstacle, Marx hopes for a sea change — a moment
 when the true revolutionary
 
will find “the spirit of  [a] new language . . . with ­
out 
recalling
 the old.” But is this anything other than a happy pipe dream?5  
According
 
to Derrida, “Marx  intends to distinguish  between the spirit {Geist) of  
the revolution and its specter (Gespenst), as if the former did not already call up
 the latter, as if everything, and Marx all the same recognizes this himself, did
 not pass by way of differences within a fantastics as
 
general as it is irreducible.  
Untimely, out of joint,’
 
even and especially if it appears to come  in due time, the  
spirit of the revolution is fantastic and anachronistic through and through” (Derri
­da 112).
Can the same thing be said about the spirit of pleasure? Certainly 
in 
“Estranged Fruit” the new can only be mediated, made conceptually profitable
 and figuratively 
pleasurable,
 via Billie Holliday’s old song. As Gildea com ­
ments: “Through the haunting beauty of her singing, Holliday was able to ‘har
­vest’ black southern lynchings of the 1930s and 1940s for a national audience,
 reaping jazz genius and political outrage from those barbarous acts. In recent
 times, Mississippi has produced
 
fresh  fruit from new  nooses.... Now that these  
forces of estrangement have been descried with the help of theories of both
 unmaking and making, it is at last possible to harvest the fruit of these Missis
­sippi
 
jail hangings” (139). This is not just a question of taste, although “fresh  
fruit” is a painful figure (whether
 
it describes murdered  bodies or death artists).  
Nor is it 
simply
 a question of what we owe the dead, although this is impor ­
tant, too. Instead, I want to return to the image itself as commodity. In trop-
 ing or turning death into figures, writing is once more exposed as an act of
 commodification and
 
consumption: a  space where death is converted into plea ­
sure.
Suddenly, we are in the territory of psychoanalysis, of
 
Freud’s death wish 
and pleasure principle, where it is customary to be swept away by gallows
 humor so reprehensible and consoling and giddy that it 
can
 only repeat itself.  
That is, in the very act of telling or troping, the object world is refigured not as
 a source of pain but of pleasure: its tension veering toward
 
zero. Can one write  
and remain in the unpleasure of death? A question terminable and inter
­minable.
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Daniel responds to these puzzles in his chapter on “Embodied Terror.” In
 
describing the pain of those tortured (by
 
the Sri Lankan Army and by Tamilese  
militants), Daniel notes the peculiar de-animation of the men and
 
women who  
describe their own torture to others. “There 
were
 no signs of contained pas ­
sion. Rather, attempts to extract information were met with expressions of
 utter listlessness. Months later I found out that it was not so much boredom
 that weighed down on the victim as it was the overwhelming sense of the sheer
 worthlessness of all attempts to communicate something that was so radically
 individuated and rendered unshareable” (143). But Daniel goes on to argue
 that those who have endured enormous pain may find some reprieve in terror
 — 
in
 the felt remembrance of pain. In “second” or therapeutic terror, “a seis ­
mic aftershock” goes through the body, terrifying those who are present when a
 torture victim is suddenly wracked by
 
sobs or anger or violent  shaking  or numb ­
ing
 
withdrawal. These convulsions have been described by a Siddha physician  
as “the pain coming out... the trembling and fear
 
that comes through remem ­
bering terrible acts” (144). This terror is not 
an
 emotion that is simply gothic  
or void of knowing but an overdetermined site for coming to deal with (not to
 heal — it offers no promise of healing) feelings so traumatic that they seem
 incommunicable, even to the self who endured them. In second, or therapeu
­tic, terror, experiences that seemed utterly alinguistic become something the
 psyche can discharge, recharge, find access to, if not control.
By
 
the end of this chapter Daniel discovers, in the poetry  and street theater  
that flourished during this period, another opening where pain can be dis
­lodged “from its fixed site.” Pain stuck
 
“at the brink of language” can be freed  
into
 
beauty, riding swiftly into our lives “on metaphor and icons of affect” (153).  
But just as swiftly, Daniel pulls back from the affective tug of his own aestheti-
 cizing argument. “Too easy,” he insists, much too easy. In seeking comfort in
 the process of recovering trauma for 
culture,
 we “need to ride our consolations 
between two echoes. . . . Poetry, prose, theater, and painting are not the only
 aestheticizing agents. The poesis of culture itself is a narcotic, and as such it
 summons us to respond to Emily Dickinson’s charge that ‘Narcotics cannot still
 the tooth / That 
nibbles
 at  the soul’” (153). It seems that we can never  be ner ­
vous enough.
Seeking such nervousness, let me turn to the letter “x.” When I first heard
 
about Journal x —
 
about the wonderfully new and borrowed name of this ambi ­
tious new journal — I felt a small shock of pleasure. The “x” seemed so au
 courant
 
and flexible, so wonderfully twenty- and thirty-something, so outmod-  
edly modish. But thinking about this journal now, as I do, through the scrim  
of 
pleasures
 derived from hanged bodies and  the hard-to-read “scene of the gal ­
lant South,” I seem to see another
 
“X” in the shadows: namely, the site of pri ­
vation and 
violence
 that marks the loss of the African name. The capitalized  
“X” of a Black Muslim idiom is not cited here, and yet it resounds in the jour
­nal’s margins, an unknown ¿/^variable that conjures up specters from the Mid
­dle Passage and beyond. What do we look for when we seek out the “x”? Do
 we seek the pleasure of the spectral unknown, or its burden? Perhaps, as a way
 of short-circuiting the proprietorship of the name, this “x” must resonate 
in both contexts, “between two echoes.”
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with an echolalia — with something  like a parable. Last night  
at dinner 
we
 were playing a “Know Your US Presidents” game with the kids. I  
asked Kiri, the 
7
-year-old, “Which president freed the slaves?” and Noah,  just  
3, shouted, “Santa Claus!” We burst into laughter at his vehemence, his cer
­tainty, and his obvious pleasure in having such a good answer. He is learning
 his history from our
 
culture's Old  Masters  —  discovering, in ways that  I’d never  
thought possible, the stinging pleasure, the consuming narcotic, the deadening
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1.
 
On the subject of hanging, Paul de Man, and lurid figures, see Hertz.
2.
 
In a moving essay about the the wrinkles and odors that still inhabit the  
garments of the dead, Peter Stallybrass writes about inheriting Allon Whites
 clothing — and inheriting with it
 
the grief and pleasure, the lingering of some ­
one else’s “human imprint,” even after his death. Stallybrass suggests another  
mode of continuity between the living and the dead: “Bodies come and go; the
 clothes which have received those bodies survive” (37).
3.
 
To investigate this idea in depth, Christopher Bollas's The Shadow of the  
Object seems achingly relevant. Bollas asks how we are held by aesthetic
 objects, by
 
the shadow of the maternal other that haunts every work  of art. He  
describes our 
early
 environment as “the experience of an object that transforms  
the 
subject
 s internal and external worlds” (28). But in talking about, or think ­
ing with, the dead, one faces the burden of 
having
 to become the transforma ­
tional object oneself. That is, one reshapes material that seems at once too full
 and too empty, in need of transformative labor but unable to respond to such
 labor
 
— an unknown invariable (see the penultimate paragraph of this essay).
4.
 
The phrase “anthropography” is borrowed from Daniel 's subtitle. Taus ­
sig
 
details numerous nervous systems in his description of the social as an ongo ­
ing state of emergency.
5.
 
This is gorgeously glossed by Gibson-Graham: “When Marx attempts  
to banish the specter, in that same moment he sets himself up for a haunting —
 by all
 
that must be erased, denied, cast out, mocked as chimerical or belittled as  
inconsequential, in order to delimit a certain objectivity. Indeed, the attempt
 to banish the specter
 
creates the possibility  and the likelihood of a  haunting. In  
the very moment of
 
exorcism, the specter is named and invoked, the ghost is  
called to inhabit the space of
 
its desired absence. The more one attempts to  










Adorno, Theodor W. 
Negative
 Dialectics. Trans. E. B. Ashton. New York:  
Continuum, 1983.
Bollas, Christopher. The Shadow of the Object: Psychoanalysis of the Unthought
 
Known. New York: Columbia UP, 1987.
Burns, John F. “Biko’s Case Now Offers Justice 
From
 a Travesty.” The New  
York Times (2 February 1997): 4.
Clifford, James. The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography,
 
Literature, and Art. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1988.
Daniel, E. Valentine. Charred Lullabies: Chapters in an Anthropography of Vio
­
lence. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1996.
De Certeau, Michel. The Practice of Everyday Life. Trans. Steven Rendell.
 
Berkeley: U California P, 1984.
Derrida, Jacques. Specters of
 
Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of  Mourning,  
and the New International. 1993. Trans. Peggy Kamuf. New York: Rout
­ledge, 1994.
Feldman, Allen. Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political
 
Terror in Northern Ireland. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1991.
Gibson-Graham, J. J. The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It). Oxford: 
Black- well, 1996.
Gildea, Barry. “Estranged Fruit: Making
 
and  Unmaking in  Mississippi’s Jails.”  
Journal xl (1996): 113-44.
Hertz, Neil. “More Lurid Figures.” Diacritics 30 (1990): 2-27.




Kamps, Ivo, and Jay Watson. “Editor’s Preface.” Journal x 1 (1996): 1-4.
Marx, Karl. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. Marx and Frederick
 
Engels. Collected Works. Vol. 11. New York: International Publishers,
 1979.
Spillers, Hortense. “Interstices: A Small Drama of Words.” Pleasure and Dan
­
ger: Exploring Female Sexuality. Ed. Carole S. Vance. Boston: Routledge,
 1984. 73-100.




Review 81 (1993): 35-75.
Stewart, Kathleen. A Space on the
 
Side  of  the Road: Cultural Poetics in an “Other”  
America. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1996.
Stevens, Wallace. “The Pleasures of Merely Circulating.” 1934. The Palm at
 
the End of the Mind. Ed. Holly Stevens. New York: Vintage, 1972. 96-7.
Taussig, Michael. The Nervous System. New York: Routledge, 1992.
Z Magazine: A Political Monthly (February 1994).
27
Yaeger: Consuming Trauma; or, The Pleasures of Merely Circulating
Published by eGrove,
